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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
COMMUNICATIONS LAW - TELEVISION - ANTISIPHONING RULES
GOVERNING MOVIE AND SPORTS CONTENT OF PAY CABLE TELEVISION
EXCEEDED JURISDICTION OF FCC UNDER FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
ACT.
Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC (D.C. Cir. 1977)
In fifteen consolidated cases, petitioners' challenged four regulations 2 of
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) which limited the program
fare that cablecasters3 could offer to the public for a fee set on a per program
or per channel basis.4 The rules, issued by the FCC in 1975,5 greatly
curtailed the ability of cablecasters 6 to show feature films or sports events if
a separate program or channel charge was levied.7 The rules also prohibited
1. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
Petitioners were Home Box Office, Inc.; Metromedia, Inc.; Columbia Pictures
Industries, Inc.; United Artists Corp. and Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.; Motion Picture
Ass'n of America, Inc.; National Ass'n of Broadcasters; American Broadcasting Co.;
CBS, Inc.; and National Broadcasting, Inc. Id. Intervenors were Professional
Baseball; American Broadcasting Co.; CBS, Inc.; and National Citizens Comm. for
Broadcasting. Id.
2. Id. at 17. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.225 (1976).
3. "Cablecasting" refers to the exhibition on a cable television system of original
programming developed by the cable television operator or another entity. First
Report and Order, 20 F.C.C.2d 201, 223 (1969). In contradistinction to the usual
function of cable television systems - the retransmission of signals that have been
received over the air from conventional broadcast stations - cablecasting does not
involve use of the broadcast spectrum, i.e., the range of frequencies of electromagnetic
waves assigned to broadcasting stations. Id. at 223.
4. 567 F.2d at 17. The petitioners also challenged similar restrictions applied to
subscription broadcast television stations. Id. See 47 C.F.R. §73.643 (1976).
Subscription television uses the broadcast spectrum to transmit programs "intended
to be received in intelligible form by members of the public only for a fee or charge."
Id. § 73.641(b).
5. First Report and Order, 52 F.C.C.2d 1 (1975). The rules were first issued by the
FCC in 1970 in Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 F.C.C.2d 825 (1970). In 1975,
after a public inquiry and a reconsideration of the rule$, the FCC readopted a slightly
revised version of the same regulations. First Report and Order, 52 F.C.C.2d 1.
That group of petitioners composed of the major broadcast networks and the
National Association of Broadcasters challenged only the amendments to the rules as
a major and arbitrary shift in FCC policy. 567 F.2d at 18 n.6. The petitioners
representing cable television, the Justice Department, and producers of programs
suitable for showing on either cable or broadcast television took the position that
"any regulation [of pay cablecasting] exceeds the authority" of the FCC. Id. at 18 n.7.
6. 567 F.2d at 17 n.2. The regulations at issue applied to both "origination"
cablecasters and "access" cablecasters. 47 C.F.R. § 76.225 (1976). The former operate
cable systems, id. § 76.5(w), while the latter lease channel time from system operators,
id. § 76.5(x). However, they applied only to cablecasting on systems that also
retransmit broadcast signals. See, id. § 76.5(a), .225.
7. 567 F.2d at 18-19. Specifically, the rules prohibited the pay cablecasting of a
feature film by a cable television system with the following exceptions: 1) the film had
been in general release for three years or less; 2) a conventional television station in
the same market had a contract to show the film; 3) the film had been in general
release for more than 10 years and had not been shown in the same market by
conventional television for three years; and 4) the film was in a foreign language. 47
C.F.R. §76.225(a) (1976).
The live cablecasting of sports events for a per program or per channel charge
was prohibited with the following exceptions: 1) a "specific event" could be exhibited
if it had not been broadcast live by a conventional television station in the same
1977-1978]
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cablecasters from devoting more than ninety percent of their cablecast hours
to movie and sports programs 8 and from showing commercial advertising on
cable channels on which programs were presented for a direct charge to the
viewer.9 The purpose of these regulations was to prevent the "siphoning" 10
of feature film and sports material from conventional broadcast television
by pay cable television 1 (CTV).12
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the
regulations as applied to pay CTV,13 holding that, while the FCC may
exercise authority over CTV to the extent "reasonably ancillary" to its
market for five seasons; 2) a "regularly recurring event" which occurred at intervals
of more than one year could be shown if it had not been broadcast live by a
conventional television station in the same market for more than 10 years; and 3) new
types of specific sports events could not be shown over cable for five years. Id.
§ 76.225(b). In addition, the number of "non-specific events" which could be shown
over cable in any given season was limited by a mathematical formula. Id.
8. 47 C.F.R. § 76.225(c) (1976).
9. Id. § 76.225(d). Originally, the regulations also restricted the pay cablecasting
of series programs, defined as those "with interconnected plot[s] or substantially the
same cast of principal characters." 47 C.F.R. 76.225(e) (1975). This section was deleted
in the Second Report and Order, 35 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 767 (1975).
10. "Siphoning" refers to the potential ability of cable television to outbid
broadcast television for a particular program, thus delaying its exhibition on
conventional television or preventing nonsubscribers from viewing it altogether.
First Report and Order, 52 F.C.C.2d 1, 8 (1975).
To illustrate how siphoning would work, the American Broadcasting Co.
posited the following situation in a reply comment to the FCC:
[S]lightly more than 1.5 million homes would pay $2.25 each for a particular
program making available [after payment to program producer and other costs]
slightly more than $1.2 million dollars to the pay cable industry for the purchase
of the program in question. This . . .compares with the $1.5 million dollars a
network might pay for two showings of a "blockbuster" feature film like Love
Story during a five-year period, and the $1 million dollars that might be paid for
a movie of somewhat less appeal.
Id. at 10.
11. Id. at 51-55. The antisiphoning objective of the regulations is also clearly
expressed in the FCC's standard for waiving the film restrictions:
Feature films otherwise excluded by this paragraph may be cablecast upon a
convincing showing to the Commission that they are not desired for exhibition
over conventional television in the market of the cable television system, or that
the owners of the broadcast rights to the films, even absent the existence of
subscription television, would not make the films available to conventional
television.
47 C.F.R. 76.225(2) (1976).
12. For a discussion of the term "CTV,"see note 19 and accompanying text infra.
13. 567 F.2d at 60. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the subscription broadcast rules (see
note 4 supra) on the basis of its decision in National Ass'n of Theatre Owners (NATO)
v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970). In NATO, the
court had affirmed substantially similar subscription broadcast television rules
promulgated in the FCC's Fourth Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.2d 466 (1968). 420 F.2d
at 208. The court observed that few, if any, subscription broadcast stations had begun
operation since 1969 and, as a result, the best information available was that
reviewed in NATO. 567 F.2d at 59-60.
In addition, the Home Box Office court remanded the record to the FCC for
supplementation with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the
nature and source of all ex parte communications made during the rulemaking
proceeding. Id. at 58-59. Of concern to the court were informal discussions not part of
[VOL. 23
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jurisdiction over broadcast television, 14 it had not established its jurisdiction
in the instant case. 15 The case was remanded to the FCC with instructions 1)
to demonstrate that the objectives to be achieved by regulating CTV were
also ones for which it could regulate the broadcast media; and 2) to state
clearly the harm that its regulations sought to remedy as well as its reasons
the public record, between FCC personnel and interested parties, such as representa-
tives of the broadcast, cable, motion picture and sports industries. Id. at 53.
According to the court, the acknowledged presence of ex parte contacts threw
the validity of the proceeding into doubt because of the possibility of "undue industry
influence." Id. The court suspected that the rules may have been shaped "by
compromise among the contending industry forces, rather than by exercise of the
independent discretion in the public interest the Communications Act vests in
individual commissioners." Id.
The court stressed that, in general, agency officials involved in a rulemaking must
avoid ex parte communications on matters relating to the proceeding. Id. at 57. If ex
parte contacts do occur, their substance must be recorded in a public file. Id.
Judge MacKinnon filed a special concurrence in which he stated that the rule
set down by the court should be limited to rulemaking proceedings involving
"competing private claims to a valuable privilege or selective treatment of competing
business interests of great monetary value." Id. at 61-64.
It should be noted that the Home Box Office court's proposition was later
rejected by another panel of the D.C. Circuit in Action for Children's Television (ACT)
v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In that case, the court stated that a rule
requiring disclosure of all ex parte communications should not apply to every case of
informal rulemaking, as the Home Box Office opinion suggested, but only when the
proceeding involves 'competing claims to a valuable privilege.' Id. at 474-77. However,
the ACT court held only that the Home Box Office rule would not be applied
retroactively to the case under consideration since it constituted "a clear departure
from established law when applied to informal rulemaking proceedings ... " Id. at
474.
14. 567 F.2d at 26-28. The "reasonably ancillary" standard followed by the Home
Box Office court was first set out by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968). The Supreme Court elaborated upon this
standard in United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972). See note 36
& 43 and accompanying text infra.
15. 567 F.2d at 34. Furthermore, the court determined, even if the antisiphoning
rules were within the FCC's jurisdiction, they would have to be vacated for lack of
evidence as to the need for regulation. Id. at 40. The D.C. Circuit stated that the FCC
failed to adequately document its two basic assumptions: 1) that siphoning would in
fact occur and 2) that it would be injurious to the public interest since it would lead to
the loss of sports and movie programming for audiences not served by CTV systems
or too poor to subscribe to pay cable. Id. at 36-40.
In response to petitioners' contention that the FCC had failed to consider the
anticompetitive effects of the challenged rules, the court concluded that the FCC had
not met its obligation to make a record for the court containing the rationale for its
conclusion that regulation was appropriate in the instant case. Id. at 40-41. The FCC
had analogized the regulatory problem presented in the case sub judice to that
considered in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968). 567 F.2d
at 41. The D.C. Circuit rejected this analogy for two reasons. Initially, the court stated
that Southwestern did not stand for the "proposition that 'unfair competition' requires
the general protection of broadcast television." Id. at 41. See note 31 infra. Secondly,
the Home Box Office court observed that, even if it had, the "unfairness" recognized in
Southwestern was not present in the instant case. 567 F.2d at 41-42. Moreover,
a'ccording to the D.C. Circuit, the balance to be struck between regulation and
competition should be based, not on legal precedent, but on the factual material
contained in the rulemaking record. Id. at 42.
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for thinking this harm exists.16 Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9
(D.C. Cir. 1977).
The earliest cable television systems were known as Community
Antenna TeleVision (CATV).17 These systems functioned simply as master
antennae, picking up and amplifying local broadcast signals and relaying
them to homes via a single cable.'8 In contrast, contemporary cable
television systems (CTV)' 9 not only retransmit broadcast signals but also
engage in cablecasting - the creation and carriage of original program-
ming.21
The FCC's ever increasing regulation of CTV has reflected CTV's
technological development 2' and the resulting threat it has posed to
16. 567 F.2d at 34. The D.C. Circuit also found the antisiphoning rules
inconsistent with the first amendment. Id. at 49-50. The court noted initially that it
had upheld similar subscription television rules in National Ass'n of Theatre Owners
(NATO) v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970). 567 F.2d at 43.
See note 13 supra. The court then concluded that NATO was not controlling since
"differences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First
Amendment standards applied to them." 567 F.2d at 43, quoting Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969).
Secondly, the court determined that the conventional justification for FCC
regulation of the broadcast media - physical interference and scarcity requiring an
umpiring role for the government - was not applicable to the regulation of CTV. 567
F.2d at 44-45.
However, the court did state that the absence in CTV of the physical
limitations of the electromagnetic spectrum did not mean that it cannot be regulated
without offending the principles of the first amendment. Id. at 46. The government,
according to the court, "may adopt reasonable regulations separating speakers
competing and interfering with each other for the same audience." Id. at 47.
The D.C. Circuit then considered the test enunciated by the Supreme Court in
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), to determine if the challenged
regulations comported with the first amendment. 567 F.2d at 48-49. The three-tiered
approach of O'Brien requires: 1) that the purpose of the regulation be unrelated to the
suppression of expression; 2) that the regulation further an important or substantial
governmental interest; and 3) that the incidental restriction on first amendment
freedoms be no greater than necessary to further that interest. United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. In applying this standard to the facts of the instant case, the
court stated that the first requirement was met since the purpose of the antisiphoning
regulations, "protecting the viewing rights of those not served by cable or too poor to
pay for cable," was neutral. 567 F.2d at 48-49. However, the D.C. Circuit concluded
that the rules failed to satisfy the remainder of the O'Brien test. Id. at 49-50. The
court stated that, since the record did not support a conclusion that a problem exists,
the regulations did not further an important governmental interest. Id. at 50.
Moreover, the court found that the rules were overbroad in light of the purposes
sought to be achieved by the FCC. Id. at 51.
17. Report and Order, 26 F.C.C. 403, 407 (1959).
18. See LaPierre, Cable Television and the Promise of Programming Diversity, 42
FORDHAM L. REV. 25, 29 (1973).
19. The FCC has recommended that the acronym "CTV" be used when referring
to contemporary cable television systems. Cable Television Report and Order, 36
F.C.C.2d 143, 144 n.9 (1972). Throughout this note, "CTV" will be used to refer to cable
television in general. Where it is necessary to distinguish between the retransmission
of broadcast signals and the origination of programming, the terms "CATV" and
"cablecasting" will be substituted. For an explanation of cablecasting, see note 3
supra. For a definition of CATV, see text accompanying note 18 supra.
20. For a further explanation of "cablecasting," see note 3 supra.
21. A CTV system, unlike conventional over-the-air broadcasting, transmits
television signals directly by wire to home receivers - television sets. LaPierre, supra
note 18, at 26. For a simplified description of the technology of CTV, see id. at 26-27.
[VOL. 23
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conventional broadcasting. 22 When CATV was introduced in the 1950's as a
means of providing improved service for rural areas where direct over-the-air
reception was poor, the FCC declined regulation on the grounds that it
lacked jurisdiction. 23 At that time, CATV was viewed as a hybrid form of
communication outside the scope of the specific grants of power given the
FCC24 under the Communications Act of 1934 (Act).25
As CATV gradually expanded its function as a "master antenna" for
local broadcast stations to include the importation of more remote television
signals over its multiple channels, 26 the FCC asserted jurisdiction over its
operations to protect the revenues and audiences of competing local
broadcasters. 27 In 1965, rules requiring the carriage of local broadcasters'
signals and prohibiting the duplication of local programming2 8 were applied
22. See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 175 (1968).
23. Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Collier, 24 F.C.C. 251 (1958); Report and Order,
26 F.C.C. 403 (1959), modified, In re Application of Carter Mountain Transmission
Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459 (1962), aff'd, Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321
F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963). In Frontier, a group of 13
broadcasters filed a complaint against 288 CATV system operators located in 36
states, asking the FCC to exercise jurisdiction over such systems as common carriers
of communications under the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609
(1970). Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Collier, 24 F.C.C. at 251. The FCC refused this
request, finding that CATV systems were not "common carriers in the ordinary sense
of the term" since the operator, not the subscriber, chose which television signals were
to be picked up and transmitted to the viewer. Id. at 254; Report and Order, 26 F.C.C.
at 441 (emphasis in original).
24. Report and Order, 26 F.C.C. 403 (1959).
25. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970). Title I of the Act created the FCC "for the purpose
of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire or radio," id.§ 151, and provided that "[t]he provisions of this chapter shall apply to all interstate
and foreign communication by wire or radio." Id. § 152. Title II granted the FCC
regulatory authority over interstate common carriers. Id. §§ 201- 221. Title III provided
for authority over interstate and foreign radio, id. §§301-329, and, by later
interpretation, television. Norman v. Century Athletic Club, 193 Md. 584, 593, 69 A.2d
466, 470 (1949).
In Report and Order, 26 F.C.C. 403 (1959), the FCC found that CATV is
"related to interstate transmission." Id. at 427. However, the FCC determined that
CATV systems were neither common carriers nor broadcasters and therefore were
within neither bf the two regulatory categories created by the Act. Id. at 427-29. As a
result, the FCC concluded that there was no basis in the statute for the assumption of
authority over these systems. Id. at 427-29, 431. Furthermore, the FCC stated that it
did not have plenary authority "to regulate any and all enterprises which happen to
be connected with one of the many aspects of communications." Id. at 429.
26. See generally United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 161-68
(1968).
27. Indirect regulation began in 1962 by virtue of the FCC's authority over the
common carrier microwave facilities that served CATV systems. In re Application of
Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C. 459 (1962), aff'd, Carter Mountain
Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963).
In Carter Mountain, the FCC denied the application of a common carrier by radio for
permission to install a microwave radio relay to pick up television signals from
distant cities and to transmit them to CATV systems. 32 F.C.C. at 465. The FCC
refused permission pending a showing that the CATV systems would not duplicate
local programming and would carry the signals of local television outlets. Id.
28. First Report and Order, 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965). The rules promulgated by the
FCC required that, upon request, a microwave-serviced CATV system carry the
signals of all local television stations. Id. at 741-43. Additionally, the regulations
mandated that a CATV system refrain from duplicating the programs of local
1977-19781
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to microwave-served CATV.29 The following year, the FCC held that the Act
conferred upon it adequate regulatory authority over all CATV systems and
issued revised rules applicable to both off-the-air and microwave-served
CATV systems 0
The Supreme Court sustained the FCC's exercise of jurisdiction over
CATV in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.31 In that case, the FCC's
order restricting expansion of service of CATV systems into the 100 largest
television markets was upheld. 32 The Court considered the theory that
section 2(a) of the Act, which states that the provisions of the statute are
applicable to "all interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio, '33
commercial stations, either simultaneously or within 15 days before or after local
broadcast. Id.
The FCC justified the imposition of these requirements on two grounds. Id. at
713. First, the failure to carry local stations and the duplication of their programs
constituted unfair competitive practices, which are inconsistent with the supplemen-
tary role of CATV. Id. at 701-06, 713. Second, these regulations were necessary to
ameliorate the risk that the burgeoning CATV industry would have a future adverse
impact on television broadcast service. Id. at 706-14.
29. Id. at 741. Microwave facilities relay television broadcast signals, normally
picked up off the air from the transmitting broadcast antenna, through a series of
radio repeaters to a terminal point near the community served by CATV. Id. at 684
n.1. Use of microwave connections enables the importation of more distant signals
that cannot be received by means of the usual off-the-air antenna. Id.
30. Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966). The FCC concluded that the
distinction between microwave and nonmicrowave systems was unwarranted and
applied the local carriage and nonduplication requirements to both. Id. at 745. For an
explanation of these requirements, see note 28 supra. In addition, the FCC prohibited
the importation by CATV of distant signals into the 100 largest television markets. 2
F.C.C.2d at 782.
The FCC, in justifying its exercise of jurisdiction over CATV, asserted:
[t]here would seem to be no question that CATV systems are engaged in interstate
communications by wire or radio. They transmit "pictures, and sounds . . .by
aid of wire" and are "instrumentalities ... used for ... the receipt, forwarding,
and delivery of communications ... incidental to such transmission," and hence
fall within the definition of wire communication under section 3(a). Moreover,
CATV systems constitute interstate communication by wire, since they form a
connecting link in the chain of communication between the point of origin (the
transmitting station) and reception by the viewing public (the CATV subscriber)
- a chain which "is now well established ... as interstate communica-
tion".... CATV systems are extensions of the interstate service of the
television broadcast stations whose signals they carry, . . . and hence constitute
"interstate communication by wire" to which the provisions of the act are
applicable.
Id. at 793-94. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
31. 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968). Midwest Television, a licensee of a San Diego
broadcast station, claimed that the transmission by Southwestern Cable Co.'s CATV
systems of signals of Los Angeles broadcasting stations into the San Diego area
fragmented the- San Diego audience. Id. at 160 n.4. The result, Midwest Television
asserted, would be the loss of advertising revenues and, ultimately, the demise of local
broadcast stations. Id.
32. Id. at 181. See note 30 supra.
33. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1970). This section provides in pertinent part:
The provisions of this chapter shall apply to all interstate and foreign
communication by wire or radio and all interstate and foreign transmission of
energy by radio, which originates and/or is received within the United States,
and to all persons engaged within the United States, in such communication or
[VOL. 23
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directly confers jurisdiction over CATV systems on the FCC."4 However, the
Court ultimately decided the case under the concept of ancillary jurisdic-
tion,3 holding that the FCC may exercise jurisdiction over CATV to the
extent "reasonably ancillary" to the effective performance of the FCC's
various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting. 36
Under this standard, the rule contested in Southwestern was sustained as
furthering the FCC's long-standing and congressionally approved policy of
attempting to provide locally controlled broadcast television service. 37 The
Court accepted the FCC's assertion that local broadcast stations were
threatened by competition from cable operators.3"
The next step on the path toward full regulation was an FCC inquiry
into the role of CTV in national communications policy. 39 Noting the trend
toward origination of programming by CTV and recognizing that it was in
such transmission of energy by radio, and to the licensing and regulating of all
radio stations as hereinafter provided.
Id.
34. 392 U.S. at 172. In response to the argument that this section does not
independently confer regulatory authority but merely establishes the media to which
the other provisions of the Act may be made applicable, the Supreme Court in
Southwestern stated:
We cannot construe the Act so restrictively. Nothing in the language of § 152(a),
in the surrounding language, or in the Act's history or purposes limits the
Commission's authority to those activities and forms of communication that are
specifically described by the Act's other provisions .... Congress in 1934 acted
in a field that was demonstrably "both new and dynamic," and it therefore gave
the Commission "a comprehensive mandate," with "not niggardly but expansive
powers."
Id. (citations omitted).
35. See notes 36-38 and accompanying text infra.
36. 392 U.S. at 178. The Court, in stressing the limits of its holding, stated:
There is no need here to determine in detail the limits of the Commission's
authority to regulate CATV. It is enough to emphasize that the authority which
we recognize today under § 152 (a) is restricted to that reasonably ancillary to the
effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the
regulation of television broadcasting. The Commission may, for these purposes,
issue "such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions,
not inconsistent with law," as "public convenience, interest, or necessity
requires." We express no views as to the Commission's authority, if any, to
regulate CATV under any circumstances and for any other purposes.
Id., quoting 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1970).
37. 392 U.S. at 174.
38. Id. at 175. The Court determined that the FCC had "reasonably found" that
the importation of distant signals into the markets of local broadcasting stations may
"'destroy or seriously degrade the service offered by a television broadcaster,'" and
thus adversely affect the public interest. Id., quoting First Report and Order, 38 F.C.C.
683, 700 (1965). Although these claims were speculative, the Court concluded that the
FCC must have authority over CATV systems in order to effectively carry out its
responsibilities under the Act. 392 U.S. at 176-77.
39. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.2d 417 (1968).
1977-19781
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the public interest, 40 the FCC promulgated a rule permitting CTV systems to
carry broadcast signals only if they also engaged in cablecasting.
41
The program origination rule prompted the second serious challenge to
the FCC regulation of CTV in United States v. Midwest Video Corp.42 In
Midwest, a four-judge plurality again applied the "reasonably ancillary"
standard43 in determining the validity of the FCC's exercise of jurisdiction.
The FCC was found to be authorized to require program origination 41 since
such a rule 45 furthered long-standing regulatory goals in the field of
television broadcasting "by increasing the number of outlets for community
self-expression and augmenting the public's choice of programs and types of
services.'46 Since the Court's affirmance of the rule liberalized the nature of
40. Id. at 418-19. This recognition was based on findings of the FCC that CTV
origination: 1) had the potential to increase the number of outlets for community self-
expression and the variety of programs without using the broadcast spectrum; 2) did
not involve unfair competition, unlike the importation of distant signals into a local
market; and 3) would be unlikely to duplicate local programming. Id., quoting
Midwest Television, Inc., 13 F.C.C.2d 478, 505-06 (1968).
41. First Report and Order, 20 F.C.C.2d 201, rev'd, Midwest Video Corp. v. United
States, 441 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 406 U.S. 649 (1972). The program
origination rule provided:
Effective on or after January 1, 1971, no CATV system having 3,500 or more
subscribers shall carry the signal of any television broadcast station unless the
system also operates to a significant extent as a local outlet by cablecasting and
has available facilities for local production and presentation of programs other
than automated services.
First Report and Order, 20 F.C.C.2d at 223. In this order the FCC also extended the
equal time, sponsorship identity, and fairness doctrines to cablecasting systems. Id. at
223-25. For a discussion of these doctrines, see generally Barrow, Program Regulation
in Cable TV: Fostering Debate in a Cohesive Audience, 61 VA. L. REv. 515 (1975);
Hagelin, The First Amendment Stake in New Technology: The Broadcast - Cable
Controversy, 44 U. CIN. L. REv. 427 (1975); Simmons, The Fairness Doctrine and
Cable TV, 11 HARV. J. LEGIs. 629 (1974). For the subsequent history of the program
origination rule, see notes 42-48 and accompanying text infra.
42. 406 U.S. 649 (1972), rehearing den., 409 U.S. 1014 (1972). Midwest Video Corp.,
an operator of CTV systems subject to the new cablecasting rules, contended that
Congress had not authorized the FCC to impose program origination requirements.
Midwest Video Corp. v. United States, 441 F.2d 1322, 1323 (8th Cir. 1971).
43. 406 U.S. at 663. The issue addressed in Midwest was whether or not the FCC's
program origination rule was "reasonably ancillary" to the FCC's jurisdiction over
broadcast television. Id. The question of the FCC's direct jurisdiction over CTV under
§ 152(a) of the Act (see notes 33-36 and accompanying text supra), left open by the
Court in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968), was not
litigated. It was, however, addressed in a footnote to the plurality opinion which
stated that, by carrying broadcast signals, CTV systems have "necessarily subjected
themselves to the Commission's comprehensive jurisdiction." 406 U.S. at 663 n.21.
The factors of the interdependency between CATV carriage of broadcast signals and
cablecasting, as well as the need for unified regulation, were said to reinforce this
conclusion. Id. See Berman, CATV Leased-Access Channels and the FCC: The
Intractable Jurisdiction Question, 51 NOTRE DAME LAw. 145, 156-57 (1975).
44. 406 U.S. at 670.
45. The FCC eventually repealed the mandatory origination requirement, having
concluded that "imposing mandatory origination rules is unlikely to best serve our
cablecasting goal. Quality, effective, local programming demands creativity and
interest. These factors cannot be mandated by law or contract." Report and Order, 49
F.C.C.2d 1090, 1105 (1974).
46. 406 U.S. at 667-68, quoting First Report and Order, 20 F.C.C.2d 201, 202
(1969).
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the "ancillariness" required under the standard set out in Southwestern,47 it
was seen as a significant expansion of the FCC's authority over CTV45
At the time the program origination rule was issued, the FCC
specifically declined to issue rules for CTV governing the showing of feature
films and sports programs 49 similar to those it had promulgated for
subscription television. 0 Nine months later, in an apparent about-face, 51 the
47. See notes 35 & 36 and accompanying text supra. The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit had set aside the FCC's program origination order, finding that it was
not reasonably ancillary to the FCC's responsibilities in the broadcasting field.
Midwest Video Corp. v. United States, 441 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1971). The court noted
the distinction between the function of broadcasters and CATV systems drawn by the
Supreme Court in Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390,
399-401 (1968). 441 F.2d at 1325-26. The Eighth Circuit relied on this distinction to
support its determination that cablecasting, which does not exploit the broadcast
spectrum, is an entirely separate business from retransmitting broadcast signals. Id.
at 1326-27.
The plurality opinion of the Supreme Court, authored by Justice Brennan, did
not address the distinction drawn by the Eighth Circuit. Justice Brennan also rejected
the contention that Fortnightly was relevant since it involved the validity of a
copyright. United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 663-64 & n.22 (1972).
Instead, the Court suggested that the FCC's authority might exist even if cable
systems did not retransmit broadcast signals:
Equally plainly the broadcasting policies the Commission has specified are
served by the program-origination rule under review. To be sure, the cablecasts
required may be transmitted without use of the broadcast spectrum. But the
regulation is not the less, for that reason, reasonably ancillary to the
Commission's jurisdiction over broadcast services.
Id. at 669.
Chief Justice Burger, concurring in the plurality opinion, observed that the
FCC's position "strains the outer limits of even the open-ended and pervasive
jurisdiction that has evolved by decisions of the Commission and the courts." Id. at
676 (Burger, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice stated that the matter was one for
Congress but concurred on the ground that, until Congress acts, the FCC should be
allowed wide latitude. Id.
Justice Douglas' dissent quoted extensively from the Fortnightly opinion and
concluded that "the upshot of today's decision was to make the Commission's
authority over activities 'ancillary' to its responsibilities greater than its authority
over any broadcast licensee." Id. at 677-81 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
48. See National Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Comm'rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 615
(D.C. Cir. 1976). In this case, D.C. Circuit observed that the holding in Midwest
constituted a "giant step" beyond the limits expressed in Southwestern. Id. at 615. See
also Note, Cablecasting: A Myth or Reality - Authority of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission to Regulate Local Program Origination on Cable Television - An
Evaluation of the Commission's Cablecasting Rules After United States v. Midwest
Video Corporation, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 804, 817-19 (1973).
49. First Report and Order, 20 F.C.C.2d 201, 204-05 (1969). The FCC reasoned:
In short, it appears to us that wire origination operations in the larger markets
may face different, and perhaps more difficult, problems than over-the-air pay-
TV; that we lack any present substantial experience in this respect in the wire
area; and that, therefore, the public interest would be best served for the present
by encouraging CATV to experiment and develop its originations free from
restriction as to interconnection or limitations as to types of programming, in the
expectation that the end result will be significant added diversity for the public.
Id. at 205.
50. See note 4 supra. The subscription television rules governing feature film and
sports content were adopted in Fourth Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.2d 466 (1968). These
regulations were upheld in National Ass'n of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194,
208 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970). See notes 13 & 16 supra.
51. Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 F.C.C.2d 825 (1970). Asserting that pay
CTV is similar to subscription television and has the same "siphoning" potential, the
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FCC applied antisiphoning rules restricting the showing of movies and
sports to pay CTV.5 2 In 1975, after an inquiry, the FCC readopted a slightly
revised version of the antisiphoning rules. 53
The court in Home Box Office5l began its analysis by adopting as the
standard for determining the FCC's statutory authority the "reasonably
ancillary" test5 5 first enunciated by the Supreme Court in Southwestern5
and later applied in Midwest.57 The D.C. Circuit observed that these
Supreme Court opinions both expanded and restricted the jurisdiction of the
FCC to regulate CTV.58 On the one hand, they recognized "an expansive
jurisdiction for the Commission based on Section 2(a)59 of the Communica-
FCC concluded that action should be taken immediately even though the threat was
not imminent. Id. at 828. The FCC stated:
As was the case with subscription television, protection of the public requires
that action be taken at a time when it involves no disruption of existing patterns.
The adoption of rules similar to those preventing siphoning television programs
from free television broadcasting to subscription television broadcasting will
serve to insure that cablecasting does not merely force the public to pay for what
it now receives free.
Id.
52. Id. at 825. Pay CTV consists of offering television programming to viewers
via cable at a per program or per channel charge. Hoffer, The Power of the FCC to
Regulate Cable Pay-TV: Jurisdictional and Constitutional Limitations, 53 DEN. L. J.
477, 480 (1976). The major technological challenges are restricting use to paying
customers and recording viewers' use for billing purposes. W. BAER & C. PILNICK, PAY
TELEVISION AT THE CROSSROADS 14 (Rand Corp. P-5159, 1974). Generally, the
programs are scrambled or otherwise encoded, making them unintelligible for
ordinary television sets. Id. at 17. Subscribers, who are drawn from the pool already
connected to the parent CTV system, pay a fee over and above the basic cable rate
and are leased a converter or decoder to receive the transmission clearly. Hoffer,
supra, at 480 n.15. For a more detailed explanation of the technology of pay CTV, see
W. BAER & C. PILNICK, supra, at 14-23.
The significance of pay CTV is that, because it substitutes a system of direct
payment by viewers for advertiser support, it is particularly well-suited to the
profitable presentation of specialized programs for minority audiences. LaPierre,
supra note 18, at 113. While conventional television programming must appeal to a
mass audience because advertisers will spend only a few cents an hour per viewer,
pay CTV works on the assumption that viewers will pay a dollar or more per hour to
watch specialized programs otherwise unavailable. W. BAER & C. PILNICK, supra, at 2.
See also LaPierre, supra note 18, at 113-14.
53. First Report and Order, 52 F.C.C.2d 1 (1975). Petitions for reconsideration
were denied except to the extent that some petitioners sought to institute reporting
procedures to facilitate enforcement of the rules. Memorandum Opinion and Order, 54
F.C.C.2d 797 (1975).
54. The Home Box. Office case was heard before Circuit Judges Wright and
MacKinnon and District Judge Weigel of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California, who sat by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 292(d)
(1970). 567 F.2d at 17. The opinion was issued per curiam. 567 F.2d at 17 n.1. Judge
Weigel filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 61. For a discussion of that opinion, see notes
82-84 and accompanying text infra. A second concurring opinion concerning the
issue of ex parte communications was specially filed by Judge MacKinnon. 567 F.2d
at 61-64. For a discussion of that opinion, see note 13 supra.
55. 567 F.2d at 25-28.
56. For a discussion of Southwestern, see notes 31-38 and accompanying text
supra.
57. For a discussion of Midwest, see notes 43 & 47 and accompanying text supra.
58. 567 F.2d at 27-28.
59. See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
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tions Act and the need to give the Commission sufficient latitude to cope
with technological developments in a rapidly changing field." 6 On the
otherhand, they restricted the FCC's authority to regulate only to achieve
"'long-established' goals or to protect its 'ultimate purposes.' ",61 In addition,
the court interpreted Midwest to require that these ends be ones for which
the FCC could also restrict broadcast television. 62 The court concluded that
"these cases establish an outer boundary to the Commission's authority."63
Applying this standard to the instant case, the Home Box Office court
first noted that the purpose of the challenged regulations was to prevent the
"siphoning" of feature film and sports material from conventional broadcast
television to pay CTV.64 The court stated that it was "clear that their thrust
is to prevent any competition by pay cable entrepreneurs for films or sports
material that either has been shown on conventional television or is likely to
be shown there.16 5
The court interpreted the FCC's position to be that it has the obligation
as well as the authority to regulate program content to maintain public
enjoyment66 and that its rules were necessary since the level of public
enjoyment would be reduced if siphoning were permitted.67 This argument
was rejected by the court on the grounds that it contradicted the traditional
view of the FCC that dictating entertainment formats is unnecessary and
inconsistent with the Act and the first amendment.68
60. 567 F.2d at 27.
61. Id. at 28.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. See notes 10 & 11 supra.
65. 567 F.2d at 28 (emphasis in original).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 29. The court disposed of a closely related argument that, because § 1 of
the Act requires the FCC to promote a nationwide communications service, the FCC
must impose antisiphoning rules since siphoning would destroy nationwide service.
Id. at 33-34. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
Section 1 provides in pertinent part:
For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communi-
cation by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the
people of the United States a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire
and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges
... there is created a commission to be known as the "Federal Communications
Commission ... "
47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
In dismissing this argument, the court stated: "We need not consider whether
Section 1 can be so construed since counsel's argument is nothing more than a naked
allegation, unsupported in the record." 567 F.2d at 33.
68. 567 F.2d at 29-32. The programming policy of the FCC has been
"that the station's [entertainment] program format is a matter best left to the
discretion of the licensee or applicants, since as a matter of public acceptance
and of economic necessity he will tend to program to meet the preferences of his
area and fill whatever void is left by the programming of other stations."
Zenith Radio Corp., 40 F.C.C.2d 223, 230 (1973), quoting Programming Policy
Statement, 25 Fed. Reg. 7293 (1960). Accord, Notice of Inquiry, 57 F.C.C.2d 580, 583
(1976).
The FCC has stated in other contexts that the first amendment and the
anticensorship provision of the Act, 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970), prevent it from requiring or
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The court next considered its own decision in Citizens Committee to
Save WEFM v. FCC,6 9 in which the D.C. Circuit had taken a position that
might be thought to lend support to the contention of the FCC in the instant
case. In WEFM, the court held that, when confronted with a proposed radio
station license assignment encompassing a change in entertainment format,
the FCC was required to consider the public interest and to regulate the
format that radio stations can present "whenever a significant segment of
the public is threatened with loss of a preferred broadcast format. '70
Nevertheless, since the FCC had not acquiesced in WEFM,71 the court
concluded that it should not affirm the challenged regulations on the basis
of that decision. 72
Furthermore, the court found that the ninety-percent and no-advertising
rules as applied to pay CTV could not be sustained. 73 The court observed
that these rules were framed in the dissimilar context of subscription
broadcast television in order to ensure a purely supplemental role for that
medium, which shares the scarce spectrum resources relied on by commer-
cial television. 74 The court stated that it saw no comparable need for the
rules in the pay CTV context, given the abundance of channels CTV
systems can carry75 as well as the orders already in effect requiring
governmental, educational, and public access to channels of every CTV
system carrying broadcast signals.76
prohibiting particular broadcast content. See, e.g., Ad Hoc Comm. on the Sugar Bowl,
29 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 70 (1973); Broadcast of Elections Projections, 38 F.C.C.2d 378
(1972).
69. 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc). In WEFM, a citizens group appealed
from FCC orders approving the assignment of a radio station license and the
assignee's proposal to change the entertainment format from classical to contempor-
ary music. Id. at 249.
70. Id. at 262.
71. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, 60 F.C.C.2d 858 (1976); Notice of
Inquiry, 57 F.C.C.2d 580 (1976).
72. 567 F.2d at 32. The court stressed that it was not reconsidering its decision in
WEFM. Id. As stated by the Home Box Office court: "The sole purpose of undertaking
this analysis is to demonstrate that the Commission has, in this proceeding,
seemingly backed into an area of regulation in which it would not assert jurisdiction
were it to face the issues directly." Id.
In addition, assuming the FCC did have the authority to promote the
objective of maintaining present levels of public enjoyment by protecting conven-
tional television structure, the court questioned the FCC's definition of "the current
level of programming as a baseline for adequate service." Id. at 31-32. The court
noted also the failure of the record to refer to the preferences of the public or to
speculate as to what kind of programming would replace that which was siphoned. Id.
73. Id. at 34. See notes 8 & 9 and accompanying text supra.
74. Id. See notes 3, 4 & 13 supra.
75. 567 F.2d at 34. Coaxial cable has the capacity to carry 40 television channels;
however, the number that can actually be carried depends upon the sophistication of
the distribution system. LaPierre, supra note 18, at 27-28. With current technology,
the capacity of one channel could be increased to over 80 channels. See, e.g., Note,
Cable Television and Content Regulation: The FCC, the First Amendment and the
Electronic Newspaper, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 133, 135 (1976). Predictions are that
foreseeable developments will make CTV's channel capacity virtually unlimited. Id.
at 135.
76. 567 F.2d at 34. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.251, .253 (1976).
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In conclusion, the court found that the regulations went beyond the
statutory authority of the FCC.7 7 With the caveat that it was not directing
the FCC to find express statutory authority for its CTV regulations, 78 the
court set forth a refined "reasonably ancillary" standard to be applied in
determining the validity of the FCC's regulation of CTV.7 9 Under this test,
the FCC must: 1) "demonstrate that the objectives to be achieved by
regulating cable television are also objectives for which the Commission
could legitimately regulate the broadcast media";" and 2) "state clearly the
harm which its regulations seek to remedy and its reasons for supposing
that this harm exists."81
In a concurring opinion, 2 Judge Weigel emphasized his view that the
FCC lacks any power to control the content of cablecasting since such
programming does not involve use of the broadcast spectrum. 3 Judge
Weigel found that Southwestern and Midwest, when read in light of their
particular facts, supported his position.84
It is submitted that the Home Box Office court sidestepped some of the
more difficult issues presented by the case by failing to confront the
jurisdictional questions 5 that have perplexed courts and commentators
since the inception of CTV.6 As a result, the court did nothing to alleviate
the persisting confusion, engendered by the dicta in Southwestern and
Midwest,87 as to whether or not the Act directly confers jurisdiction over
CTV on the FCC.8 Moreover, in adopting the "ancillary to broadcasting"
77. 567 F.2d at 34.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 61.
83. Id. Specifically, Judge Weigel stated that the Act did not grant the FCC the
asserted authority:
It seems to me that if there could be any governmental interest justifying this
species of censorship, it is an interest which Congress has not empowered the
Commission to assert. In relation to cablecasting, the power is so fraught with
the potential for impingement upon First Amendment rights that it should not be
sanctioned by implication.
Id.
For an explanation of cablecasting, see note 3 supra. For a discussion of the
FCC's authority to regulate cablecasting, see notes 85-90 and accompanying text
infra.
84. 567 F.2d at 61. For the facts of Southwestern and Midwest, see notes 32-38 &
42-48 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the limitations of
Southwestern and Midwest as precedents conferring authority on the FCC to regulate
pay cablecasting, see notes 91-94 and accompanying text infra.
85. Some of the petitioners had contended that any regulation over pay CTV
exceeded the authority of the FCC. See note 5 supra.
86. For in-depth accounts of the jurisdictional history of the FCC and CTV, see,
e.g., Berman, supra note 43; Hagelin, supra note 41; LaPierre, supra note 18.
87. See notes 33 & 43 and accompanying text supra.
88. See Hoffer, supra note 52, at 482-86. This commentator examined the text of
the Act, the concept of ancillary jurisdiction and the plenary rulemaking powers
granted the FCC in the Act and concluded that the FCC lacks any power over pay
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approach without question,8 9 the court perpetuated a standard which has
been widely criticized because it raises serious jurisdictional issues and
regulates CTV as an appendage to broadcasting rather than in its own
right. °
Specifically, it is submitted that the court's treatment of the jurisdic-
tional issues was deficient because it overlooked the inadequacies of
Southwestern and Midwest as precedents conferring authority on the FCC
to regulate pay cablecasting. The jurisdiction upheld in Southwestern
applied only to CATV systems that carried signals of television broadcast
stations exclusively. 91 In addition, jurisdiction was extended over cablecast
operations in Midwest only with the reluctant concurrence of Chief Justice
Burger and over a strong dissent.92 Moreover, in assuming that ancillary
jurisdiction over cablecast operations unquestionably exists,93 the D.C.
Circuit failed to address the jurisdictional issue in light of the apparent
difference between the business of retransmitting signals originally sent
over the broadcast spectrum and that of cablecasting, which makes no use
of the broadcast spectrum. 94
In contrast to its treatment of the jurisdictional issues, the D.C.
Circuit did not neglect to address the second criticism of the "reasonably
ancillary" approach. At several points in the opinion, the court questioned
the underlying assumption of the FCC's arguments95 that CTV should be
cablecasting. Id. at 486, 488-89. In his discussion of Southwestern and Midwest, the
author summarized:
Thus, despite the assertions found in these cases, it cannot be said that the
Supreme Court has squarely held section 2(a) of the Act to be a grant of power
broad enough to include jurisdiction over cable pay-TV. Indeed, if the power of
the FCC were as great as is suggested in dictum, the theory of "ancillaryjurisdiction," on which the Court actually relied in Southwestern Cable and
Midwest Video, would be unnecessary.
Id. at 486.
89. See,567 F.2d at 25-28.
90. See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON COMMUNICATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, CABLE TELEVISION: PROMISE VERSUS
REGULATORY PERFORMANCE, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29 (Subcomm. Print 1976)
(hereinafter cited as CABLE TELEVISION REPORT]. See generally Comment, Regulation
of Pay-Cable and Closed Circuit Movies: No Room in the Wasteland, 40 U. CHI. L.
REV. 600 (1973); Note, supra note 75, at 133.
91. The Supreme Court, in Southwestern, made this limitation clear in its
description of the functions of CATV:
CATV systems perform either or both of two functions. First, they may
supplement broadcasting by facilitating satisfactory reception of local stations
in adjacent areas in which reception would not otherwise be possible; and
second, they may transmit to subscribers the signals of distant stations entirely
beyond the range of local antennae.
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 163 (1968). See Berman, supra
note 43, at 153.
92. For an overview of the plurality, concurring and dissenting opinions in
Midwest, see note 47 supra.
93. 567 F.2d at 25-28.
94. Even though the Eighth Circuit stressed this distinction in Midwest, Justice
Brennan did not treat it in his plurality opinion. For a discussion of the Midwest
opinions, see note 47 supra. See also Note, supra note 48, at 818. For an explanation of
cablecasting; see note 3 supra.
95. In reconsidering the antisiphoning rules imposed in 1970, the FCC framed the
problem as "how pay-cablecasting can best be regulated to provide a beneficial
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merely supplementary to conventional broadcasting. 96 Furthermore, in
applying the "reasonably ancillary" standard, the court's appraisal of the
objectives to be advanced by the regulations in issue indicated a refusal,
novel on the part of a reviewing court in the context of CTV regulation, to
take the assertions of the FCC at face value.
97
It is submitted, however, that the court's suggestion that its decision in
WEFM lent some support to the FCC's contention that it had authority to
regulate the content of pay CTV98 is misleading. WEFM is not on point since
it arose in the context of the FCC's authority to review changes in
entertainment format at the time of approving assignment of a radio station
license.99 More importantly, the differences between the two media are so
significant that any comparison as justification for regulation of content is
inappropriate. 10 0 Radio, like conventional television, depends upon the
limited broadcast spectrum so that the loss of a unique entertainment
format would be felt by its listeners.101 In contrast, since CTV has an
supplement to over-the-air broadcasting without at the same time undermining the
continued operation of that 'free' television service." Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 35 F.C.C.2d 893, 898 (1972).
At the time of readopting the pay cablecasting rules, the FCC elaborated upon
this supplemental role:
[Pay] television's potential to expand the public's program choices, to supple-
ment the programming now provided by conventional television, gives it an
important role to play in our national communications structure. It is this
supplemental role that our [pay] programming rules are designed to promote,
while at the same time insuring that the public's reliance on conventional
television is not unreasonably impaired.
First Report and Order, 52 F.C.C.2d 1, 43 (1975).
96. 567 F.2d at 31-32, 34, 36. See text accompanying notes 74-76 supra.
97. The Supreme Court in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157
(1968), upheld the FCC's jurisdiction even though the harm was admittedly
speculative. Id. at 176-77. See note 38 supra.
Similarly, in United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972), the
Court accepted the FCC's assertions that the cablecasting requirement would promote
the public interest. Id. at 673-75. However, the rule was repealed two years later
because it was ineffective. Report and Order, 49 F.C.C.2d 1090, 1105 (1974). See note 45
supra.
The Home Box Office court, on the other hand, not only examined the
objective of maintaining present levels of public enjoyment in light of the FCC's
authority to promote it, but also questioned the FCC's assumption that the current
level of programming on conventional television was optimum. 567 F.2d at 31-32. See
notes 67-72 and accompanying text supra.
In addition, the court rejected as inadequate the evidence offered by the FCC
that siphoning actually occurred. See note 15 supra. Several commentators have
expressed similar doubts as to the potential impact of CTV on broadcast television.
See, e.g., Hagelin, supra note 41, at 516-22; LaPierre, supra note 18, at 115-16;
Comment, supra note 90, at 609-11; Note, supra note 75, at 140-42.
98. See text accompanying notes 69-72 supra.
99. Citizens Committee to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246, 249, 262 (1974). The
Home Box Office court did acknowledge in a footnote that application of WEFM to
CTV would require additional thought. 567 F.2d at 30-31 n.49. See notes 69-72 and
accompanying text supra.
100. See generally Note, supra note 75, at 135 n.18, 144-45; Hoffer, supra note 52,
at 480-81, n.17.
101. See generally Note, supra note 75, at 135 n,18, 144-45; Hoffer, supra note 52,
at 480-81 n.17.
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apparently unlimited channel capacity, 10 2 arguments justifying regulation
of its content to promote diversity of programming have little force.
Although the court stressed the narrow confines of its holding and
suggested that the FCC may be able to satisfy the jurisdictional prerequi-
sites after remand, the Home Box Office decision will probably have greater
permanence. Even if the jurisdictional defects are corrected, the FCC faces
other formidable obstacles to achieving approval of the challenged regula-
tions.'03
The major impact of the decision will undoubtedly be an increased rate
of development for pay cablecasting operations. 0 4 Removing the restrictions
may also have an ancillary effect on CTV's development in major markets
where broadcast reception is good since the attractive pay cablecasting
service will draw subscribers.0
5
The FCC's restrictive policies have been blamed for retarding the
development of pay cablecasting. 0 6 Paradoxically, although the rules were
justified as necessary to promote the established goal of program diversi-
ty, I0 7 the unrestricted use of popular movie and sports fare may be the most
effective way to achieve the FCC's objective. While pay CTV offers the
potential for programs that serve small, specialized audiences, 10 8 it must
first establish a market for itself with programming of wider appeal.109 With
a large subscriber base providing financial viability, it is submitted that the
industry will be sooner able to offer the cultural and minority programming
to which it is better suited than conventional television."
0
In addition, the court's invalidation of the antisiphoning rules may
signify an end to the unquestioning acceptance by the courts over the past
twenty years of the FCC's position that CTV should be purely supplemental
to conventional television."'
In creating the FCC in 1934, Congress directed it "to make available, so
far as possible, to all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient,
Nation-wide and world-wide . . . communication service" 1 2 and to "[s]tudy
new uses for radio, provide for experimental uses of frequencies, and
generally encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public
102. See note 75 supra.
103. See notes 13, 15 & 16 supra.
104. See LaPierre, supra note 18, at 118. Two commentators have suggested that
pay cablecasting could grow to a billion dollar industry by 1980 if the antisiphoning
programming restrictions were lifted. W. BAER & C. PILNICK, supra note 52, at 13.
105. See W. BAER & C. PILNICK, supra note 52, at 6. See also CABLE TELEVISION
REPORT, supra note 90, at 62.
106. LaPierre, supra note 18, at 117.
107. See notes 64-67 and accompanying text supra.
108. See note 52 supra.
109. W. BAER & C. PILNICK, supra note 52, at 2. Most pay cablecasting operations
have relied extensively on sports and movies. Id. at 9. See LaPierre, supra note 18, at
118.
110. See W. BAER & C. PILNICK, supra note 52, at 9, 11; LaPierre, supra note 18, at
118-19; Note, supra note 75, at 136-38.
111. See notes 95-96 and accompanying text supra.
112. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
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